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Abstract
Full duplex (FD) protocol has been widely used in wireless communications, which could transmit and receive
signals at the meantime. In this paper, considering the worst-case channel uncertainty, opportunistic relaying and
jamming strategy in decode-and-forward (DF) hybrid full/half-duplex (HD) relay system is proposed to enhance
security. Specifically, the relay works in FD protocol to receive the confidential signals and transmit jamming signals
at the first time slot. Then, the relay switches to HD protocol to transmit the decoded signals. Meanwhile, jammers
emit cooperative jamming (CJ) signals to interfere the eavesdropper at two transmission slots. Suppose that
imperfect eavesdropper channel condition is considered, we propose a worst-case robust design to obtain
distributed jamming weights, which is solved through semi-definite program (SDP). Furthermore, we analyze
secrecy rate and secrecy outage performance of the proposed scheme. As a benchmark, a traditional relay selection
strategy with HD protocol in distributed relay system is listed for comparison. Simulation results demonstrate that
our hybrid scheme with robust design outperforms the traditional relay selection scheme, because the traditional
scheme does not consider hybrid FD/HD protocols and robust design based on imperfect channel conditions.
1 Introduction
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels which
makes communication ubiquitously accessible, security
becomes one of the most important issues in wireless
communications. Traditionally, communication security
is guaranteed through high-layer encryption. With the
development of interception technology and computing
power, encryption needs to be more complex, leading to
higher computation burden. Unlike traditional crypto-
graphic approaches, physical layer security (PLS) takes
advantage of the physical characteristics of wireless
channels to achieve secure transmission. Wyner pointed
out that when the legitimate channel has better propa-
gation conditions than eavesdropping channel, secret
transmission is theoretically possible without sharing
any key [1].
However, if the channel condition of legitimate user is
worse than that of the eavesdropping channels, secrecy
rate can be very low or even decline to zero [1]. An
efficient solution to enhance the legitimate transmission
is through cooperative relaying or confusing the eaves-
droppers via cooperative jamming. Recently, relay co-
operation diversity has attracted more and more
attentions, as it can significantly improve the communi-
cation coverage area and secrecy performance [2, 3]. To
simplify radio hardware in cooperative diversity setups,
relay selection strategy is adopted for multiple relay
nodes communication. A distributed opportunistic relay
selection approach was proposed in cooperative relay
system [4]. This relay selection strategy achieves the
same secrecy rate performance with low complexity,
compared to the scheme that all nodes participate in
aiding the communications.
Alternatively, the cooperative nodes can also act as
jammers to transmit artificial jamming signals collabora-
tively to interfere the eavesdroppers. In [5], the coopera-
tive jamming (CJ) was investigated for Gaussian multiple
access and two-way channels. The optimal CJ weights
for secrecy rate maximization (SRM) problem in the
presence of a single eavesdropper were studied in [6].
Furthermore, hybrid relaying and jamming schemes
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were proposed to combine the advantages of both strat-
egies in [4, 7].
Full-duplex (FD) operation, which always transmits and re-
ceives signals in the entire bandwidth, has attracted extensive
attention. And a range of theoretical and practical researches
have been investigated to take advantages of characteristic of
FD protocol to enhance system performance [8, 9]. An inter-
esting work was proposed in [8], where artificial noise (AN)
was sent by a multi-antenna FD receiver. In [8], authors
aimed to design the optimal jamming vector that maximizes
the secrecy rate and mitigates loop interference. To enhance
secrecy performance of a multiple-input-single-output-
single-eavesdropper (MISOSE) relay system, a joint informa-
tion beamforming and jamming beamforming strategy were
proposed to guarantee both transmitting security and receiv-
ing security for a FD base station in [9]. Some works also
make use of the advantages of both FD and HD protocols to
improve system performance. The hybrid scheme that
switches between FD and HD protocols can be employed to
enhance secrecy performance [10, 11].
However, in the above works [8–11], the perfect in-
stantaneous channel state information (CSI) of all links
is needed at the nodes which carry out the optimization
procedure. Nevertheless, in practical relay communica-
tion networks, the perfect CSI is usually unknown and
has to be estimated. The mismatch between the real and
estimated CSI is caused by some inevitable factors, such
as channel estimation errors, feedback delay, and
quantization errors. Obviously, the performance of the
designs developed in [8–11] could be heavily degraded
by the imperfect CSI. Robust algorithm is an effective
way to eliminate the influence of estimation errors. Typ-
ically, the existing works usually use deterministic uncer-
tainty model (DUM) to characterize imperfect CSI: it
assumes that a nominal value of the instantaneous CSI
is available but lies in a bounded uncertainty region de-
fined by some norm. The authors in [12] investigated
the worst-case robust transmit covariance design prob-
lem of secrecy-rate maximization in the presence of
multiple eavesdroppers. In [13], cooperative transmission
for securing a decode-and-forward (DF) two-hop network
was studied, where only the statistical CSI of the eaves-
dropping channel is available.
To sum up, the researches above only investigate the
secrecy performance in FD or HD networks, and little
work has been done for hybrid relay networks with
opportunistic relay selection. Moreover, cooperative
jamming with robust design is not widely considered in
multi-relay systems, which can eliminate the influence of
estimation errors.
In this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance
of opportunistic relaying and jamming in hybrid FD/HD
relay network with channel uncertainty. The contribu-
tions of the paper are summarized as follows:
 We propose a hybrid FD/HD strategy and
opportunistic proactive relay selection approach in
our model, where the best relay is selected to switch
between FD and HD operation to DF confidential
signals. And the other relay nodes send distributed
cooperative jamming signals to interfere the
receiving signal and interference with noise ratio
(SINR) at the eavesdropper.
 In order to eliminate the influence of imperfect CSI
to enhance the system security performance, we
adopt the worst-case robust design to obtain the CJ
beamformer under channel uncertainty. The
optimization problem based on robust design is
solved by SDP and interior method.
 We derive the secrecy rate and secrecy outage
expressions. Furthermore, we compare our scheme
with a traditional relay selection scheme. Simulation
results clearly show the advantage of our proposed
scheme to improve system secrecy performance.
1.1 Notation
Bold uppercase and lowercase letters denote matrices
and vectors, respectively. (•)T and (•)H stand for trans-
pose and Hermitian’s transpose of a matrix or vector, re-
spectively. IN is the N ×N identity matrix. CN(τ, σ
2)
denotes the circularly symmetric, complex Gaussian dis-
tribution of vectors with mean τ and variance σ2.
2 System model
The system shown in Fig. 1 consists of a source node S,
M cooperative nodes, an intended receiver D, and a
legitimate user E, in which cooperative nodes are
equipped with both the receive antenna and the transmit
antenna and other nodes are equipped with single an-
tenna. In this model, the source S sends private message
x, which is destined for intended receiver D and kept
secret from receiver E. Before the source transmission,
the opportunistic relay R has to be selected, which will
Fig. 1 Hybrid FD/HD relay model
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be introduced in Section 3; the other cooperative nodes
Ji, (1 ≤ i ≤M − 1) are used to send jamming signals.
In particular, we assume the direct path between S and
D is blocked by some obstacle so that there is no effect-
ive S-D link. Otherwise, if S-D link exits, system has to
separate the useful signals from jamming signals, which
will complicate the model. hsr, hse, hrd, hre, hjr, hjd, and
hje denote the channel coefficients of S-R, S-E, R-D, R-E,
R-R, Ji-R, Ji-D, and Ji-E links, respectively, where hjr, hjd,
and hje are stacked in M − 1 × 1 vector and other chan-
nel coefficients are scalars.
Throughout this paper, the following assumptions are
adopted: (1) The channels from transmitting nodes to
receiving nodes are symmetric, all the channels involved
are considered to remain constant during one operation
period and are quasi-static. (2) All the noise distribu-
tions are zero-mean circular complex Gaussian with unit
variance σ2. (3) All the channel coefficients experience
Rayleigh fading, and the corresponding channel gains
are obtained as γi = Pi|hi|
2/σ2, (i ∈ sr, se, rd, re) which are
independently exponentially distributed with mean of λi,
γk ¼ Pk hHk f
 2; k ∈ jr; jd; jeð Þ and γk ∼ Erlang(M − 1, λk).
(4) The self-interference (SI) γrr is well reduced to a tol-
erable level by efficient SI suppression. (5) The intended
user D and legitimate user E employ maximum radio
combination (MRC) technology to receive signals.
At time slot t, source S sends private message x(t),
which is destined for opportunistic relay R and kept se-
cret from eavesdropper E, R receive x(t) from S. Mean-
while, opportunistic relay R and cooperative nodes Ji
transmit the jamming signal zr(t) and j(t), respectively.
Since we assume that there is no direct link of S-D, legit-
imate destination cannot receive any useful information
except jamming signal at time slot t; thus, we can neg-
lect the receiving signal at D. The receiving signals at
the relay R and eavesdropper E are given by








hrr tð Þzr tð Þ
þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPJp hHjr tð Þf r j tð Þ þ nr tð Þ ð1Þ








hre tð Þzr tð Þ
þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPJp hHje tð Þf r j tð Þ þ ne tð Þ; ð2Þ
where x(t) and j(t) denote the transmitted useful signals
and jamming signals with Ε{|x(t)|2, |j(t)|2} = 1, respect-
ively. The term nr and ne represent naturally occurring
noise at best relay R and eavesdropper E. At time slot t,
the distributed jamming beamforming weight is stacked
in vector fr = [fr1, fr2,⋯, fr(M − 1)]
T, and since the beam-
forming weight only determine the transmit direction,
we normalize one-dimensional vector fr as f
H
r f r
  ¼ 1 .
We assume that there exist per-node power constraints
of all the nodes. PS denotes the consumed power of the
source, PR denotes the consumed power of the
opportunistic relay, while PJi(1 ≤ i ≤M − 1) denotes the
consumed power of cooperative node Ji, respectively.
And to relax the complexity, we assume PJi = PJ, (1 ≤ i ≤
M − 1). Thus, we can regard the cooperative jamming
nodes as a multi-antenna jammer to emit weighted jam-
ming signals to interfere eavesdropper.
At time slot t + 1, the chosen relay R switches to HD
model and only transmits the previously decoded x(t) to D.
At the same time, S transmits the jamming signal zs(t + 1),
and cooperative nodes Ji still emit jamming signals j(t + 1).
The receiving signals at D and E equal




hrd t þ 1ð Þx tð Þ
þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPJp hHjd t þ 1ð Þfdj t þ 1ð Þ þ nd t þ 1ð Þ
ð3Þ








hre t þ 1ð Þx tð Þ
þ ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃPJp hHje t þ 1ð Þfdj t þ 1ð Þ þ ne t þ 1ð Þ:
ð4Þ
While at time slot t + 1, the distributed jamming
beamforming weight is stacked in vector fd = [fd1, fd2,⋯,
fd(M − 1)]
T.
Regarding the available CSI in a wireless communica-
tion system, the receiver usually estimates the channel
using a training sequence (pilot symbols). At the trans-
mitter, the CSI can be obtained through a feedback
channel or from previous received signals, exploiting the
channel reciprocity in time division duplexing (TDD)
(see [14] for an overview of different channel estimation
strategies). In this paper, we assume that the CSI hje is
partially known at jammers, and this situation is reason-
able while E is a legitimate user but also a potential ac-
tive eavesdropper in wireless network [15–17]. Since the
wireless system tries to enhance secrecy performance
through signal processing at distributed jammers, thus,
the system requires the receiving nodes feedback corre-
sponding CSI to jammers. The potential eavesdropper
additionally exchanges messages with the relay, appear-
ing as a legitimate user. The goal of E is not only to
intercept private message but also to feedback false
training signals to interfere the estimation on S-E and
Ji-E links.
In this correspondence, we consider the additive
model for the eavesdropping channel state information
(ECSI) available at jamming nodes as follows, which will
be used in Section 3.
hje ¼ ~hje þ eje ð5Þ
where ~hje denotes estimation of the channel hje and eje-
denotes channel uncertainty. Since we assume the
ECSI at jamming nodes are imperfect, we consider
DUM, where the error is deterministically bounded,
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i.e., eje ∈ℜ{e : ‖e‖ ≤ ε}, where ε is assumed to be the
upper bound on the channel uncertainty.
3 Opportunistic relaying and jamming
3.1 Opportunistic relaying
Traditionally, there are two strategies of opportunistic
relay selection: reactive relay selection and proactive relay
selection (Fig. 2). Specifically, the reactive strategy first
chooses the nodes to form a collection, which can suc-
cessfully decode signals between the links of S-R. Then,
the best relay is selected from the collection that maxi-
mizes the instantaneous channel gains of R-D link. Con-
versely, the proactive selection would choose the best
relay prior to the source transmission, which depends on
instantaneous channel gains of both S-R and R-D links. In
this paper, we adopt proactive selection strategy in the
hybrid FD/HD relay system.
In opportunistic proactive selection, the best relay R*
is selected from a collection of M possible cooperative
nodes prior to the source transmission. It requires that
each relay should know its own instantaneous channel
gains of S-R and R-D links. The best relay is chosen to
maximize the minimum of the weighted channel gains
between S-R and R-D links for all the M relays.
R ¼ argmaxWk ; k ¼ 1;…;M




where ζ denotes power allocation at the source. In this
case, the communication through the best relay would
fail to outage while either S ‐ R* or R* ‐D links occur
outage.
Since the minimum of two independent exponential
distributed variables also follows exponential distribution









From (7), we obtain the outage probability of oppor-
tunistic proactive relay system as follows:




































In proactive selection strategy, selecting a single relay
before the source transmission could potentially results
in degraded performance. On the other hand, selecting a
single relay for information forwarding before source
transmission simplifies the receiver design and the over-
all network operation, since proactive selection is
equivalent to routing. Although active selection is more
precise because it depends on instantaneous CSI during
the communication, it would cost additional spectrum
during transmission to select best relay. Conversely, pro-
active selection can facilitate the receiver operation and
system design while all the cooperative nodes stay idle
except the opportunistic relay during the transmission.
Thus, our opportunistic proactive relay strategy can be
viewed as energy efficient.
3.2 Cooperative jamming with robust design
Unlike traditional opportunistic relay selection, except
the chosen relay, the remaining nodes would stay idle.
In our proposed scheme, the other cooperative nodes
operate as jammers to suppress the eavesdropping
process.
If the ECSI is known (for instance, the eavesdropper is
an active user in the wireless network, it has to feed back
its CSI), the source transmits designed CJ beamformer
to enhance the security of system, which suppresses or
eliminates the information leakage to eavesdropper.
During the two time slots, cooperative jamming beam-
former depends on J-R and J-D links, respectively; thus,
Fig. 2 Relay selection strategy: opportunistic relay selection can be
performed proactively before the source transmission or reactively
after the source transmission [21]. The grade band indicates when
relay selection occurs
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jamming signals would have no influence on the chosen
relay and legitimate D.
First, under the assumption that ECSI is available, we
apply zero-forcing (ZF) algorithm on the jamming beam-
forming design, which requires that hHjr f r ¼ 0 . At time
slot t, we assume that beamformer fr is a unit-
normalized one-dimensional vector for the cooperative
jamming. For the case of perfect CSI, the constraint of





s:t: hHjr f r ¼ 0; fHr f r
  ¼ 1: ð9Þ
The solution of (9) is referred as the null-steering
beamformer, which is written as
f r ¼ IM−Hð Þhje
IM−Hð Þhje
  ; ð10Þ
where H ¼ hjr hHjr hjr
 −1
hHjr is the orthogonal matrix
onto the subspace spanned by hjr. On the other hand,
the optimal CJ beamformer fd at time slot t + 1 can be
obtained with the same way.
However, it is impractical for the relay to obtain per-
fect ECSI in some cases (channel estimation errors, feed-
back delay, and quantization errors), and we cannot
optimize system performance without knowledge of the
eavesdropper’s CSI. Thus, we follow the robust approach
of [12] to find the optimal CJ beamformer under imper-







Qz ~hje þ eje
 	
s:t: hHjrQzhjr ¼ 0;
ð11Þ
where Qz ¼ f rfHr denotes jamming matrix; problem (11)

















Problem (12) is a SDP with a set of linear matrix
inequality (LMI) constraints. Note that eje is not explicit
in (12), the optimal robust matrix Qz is derived from the










Using the Lagrange theorem, the problem (13) can be
written as
L eje; λ
 	 ¼ eHje Qz þ λIM 	eje þ 2Re eHjeQz ~hje 
þ ~hHjeQz ~hje−λε2; ð14Þ
where λ ≥ 0. When eje ¼ −~hHjeQz Qz þ λIM
 	−1
, the mini-













s:t: Qz þ λIM≻ 0; Q
H
z




















Problem (16) can be efficiently solved by well-studied
interior-point algorithm-based package SeDuMi [18].
After Qz and eje are obtained, then, we can get the opti-




The hybrid FD/HD technology is adopted at the relay to
strengthen the interference on eavesdropper to enhance
system secrecy performance. However, the whole transmis-
sion is divided into two time slots; the source uses two time
slots to transmit a same data packet. Thus, the capacity is
computed by a one-half coefficient, which is given by
Csr ¼ 12 log2 1þ
PS hsrj j2
PR hrrj j2 þ PJ hHjr f r



















Since jammers emit cooperative jamming signals in
the null space of J-R and J-E links, respectively, jamming
signals have no effect on the relay and destination D.
The channel capacity of R-D link is given by
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Thus, the capacity of main channel is










On the other hand, from (1)–(4), the capacity of eaves-
dropping channel is obtained as
CE ¼ 12 log2
 
1þ PS hsej j
2
PR hrej j2 þ PJ ~hHje f r
 2 þ σ2
þ PR hrej j
2
PS hsej j2 þ PJ ~hHje fd






γre þ γ jer þ 1
þ γre




where γ jer ¼ PJ ~hHje f r
 2=σ2; γ jed ¼ PJ ~hHje fd 2=σ2.
Thus, the secrecy rate of this hybrid FD/HD system










γre þ γ jer þ 1
þ γre




where [G]+ = max(G, 0).
4.2 Secrecy outage probability
Secrecy outage refers to the event that the secrecy
rate falls below a prescribed transmission rate,
equals P{CHFD < Rth}. In this part, we will analyze the
outage performance. At first, letting X ¼ min γsrγrrþ1 ; γrd
 
,
Y ¼ γseγreþγ jerþ1þ
γre
γseþγ jedþ1 and Z ¼
1þX
1þY , the secrecy outage
probability of the transmission is written as
PHFD ¼ P CHFD < Rthð Þ
¼ P 1þ X










f X xð Þf Y yð Þdxdy:
ð22Þ
The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X can
be obtained as




λsr þ λrrx : ð23Þ
Thus, the probability density function (PDF) of X is given as




λsr þ λrrxð Þλrd þ
λsr




Since γ jer ¼ PJ jhHje f rj2=σ2; γ jed ¼ PJ jhHje fdj2=σ2 , which
follow Erlang distribution of M − 1 orders with parameter
λje. The PDF and CDF of γjer and γjed can be expressed as




















To simplify the deduce, we assume γre + γjer≫ 1, γse +
γjed≫ 1. Then, Y is written as Y ¼ γseγreþγ jer þ
γre
γseþγ jed . Thus,
the PDF of Y is obtained as














k þ 1ð Þ λje−λre
 k
λje þ λsez







Substituting (24) and (27) into (22), the secrecy outage




f Y yð Þ 1−
e−
λsrþλrdð Þ 2Rth yþ1ð Þ−1ð Þ
λsr λrd







4.3 Comparison with existing work
As shown above, an opportunistic relaying strategy with
CJ is proposed in distributed relay networks. In
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comparison, cooperative transmission for securing a DF
dual-hop network where massive cooperative nodes co-
exist with a potential single eavesdropper is investigated.
In [19], it adopts opportunistic relay strategy and works
in HD model. Besides, it assumes instantaneous perfect
CSI of the eavesdropper’s channel is available.
In [19], a conventional relay selection strategy is pro-
posed during the second phase of the protocol. The
existing solutions are summarized as follows:
(1)Conventional selection (CS): This solutions does not
take the eavesdropper channels into account, and
the relay node is selected based on the instantaneous
CSI of the S-D links. Although it is an effective
solution for non-eavesdropper environments, it
cannot support systems with secrecy constraints.
The conventional selection is written as





(2)Optimal selection (OS): The optimal selection scheme
takes the relay-eavesdropper links into account and
decides the relay node based on the knowledge of
both R-D and R-E links. The optimal selection
maximizes the secrecy capacity and is given as






(3)Suboptimal selection (SS): The suboptimal selection
consists of a practical implementation of the optimal
selection as it avoids the instantaneous estimate of
the R-E links by deciding the appropriate relay based
on the knowledge of expectation of R-E CSI. It is a
solution which efficiently fills the gap between
optimal and conventional selection with a low
implementation/complexity overhead. The
suboptimal selection is expressed as









In this comparison, we assume opportunistic relay se-
lection strategy in [19] adopts reactive relay selection
and OS, which is optimal in the above three strategy.
However, due the effect of estimation errors, we assume
the instantaneous knowledge of the eavesdropping
channel is imperfect.
The difference between our proposed scheme and
relay selection scheme in [19] can be described as
follows:
 The authors in [19] deal with relay selection in
cooperative networks with secrecy constraints. The
proposed scheme in [19] enables an opportunistic
selection of relay nodes to increase secrecy
performance. The selected relay assists the source to
deliver confidential information to destination via
DF strategy. The proposed selection technique
protects the primary destination against interference
and eavesdropping. However, the approach is
analyzed based on instantaneous perfect knowledge
of the eavesdropper channels, which is assumed
imperfect.
 Unlike the traditional relay selection strategy in [19],
after the best relay is selected, it would not select
the optimal jammer to transmit artificial jamming
signals. Our proposed scheme selects the best relay
to switch between FD and HD operation to
deteriorate the receiving SINR at the eavesdropper.
At the first time slot, the best relay works in FD
protocol to receive useful signals from source and
emit artificial jamming signals to interfere
eavesdropper. At the second time slot, source
transmits artificial jamming signals and relay switch
to HD protocol to DF the confidential signals. It can
simultaneously avoid the interference at destination
from the source and degrade the receiving at
eavesdropper.
 Besides, the instantaneous knowledge of all links and
average knowledge of the eavesdropper links are
considered in [19]. However, in practical, the perfect
CSI is usually unknown and has to be estimated.
The performance of the designs based on imperfect
CSI will be heavily degraded. In our proposed
scheme, we propose a worst-case robust design to
obtain the CJ beamformer under channel uncertainty
to improve secrecy performance, while traditional
relay selection scheme [19] is based on estimated
ECSI. Our robust algorithm can be viewed as an
effective way to eliminate the influence of estimation
errors.
5 Numerical analysis
In this section, we present simulation results to illustrate
the performance analysis mentioned in Section 4 and
compare our proposed scheme with [19]. For conveni-
ence, we assume the noise power σ2 = 1 and number of
cooperative nodes is M = 5. To simplify the deducing,
we consider Gaussian’s noise in the channel estimation
and define spherical uncertainty regions with a radius
equal to ε ¼ g ~hje
 ; 0≤g≤1 . Note that for these uncer-
tainty regions, hje ¼ ~hje þ eje≠0; ∀eje ∈ℜ.
In Fig. 3, we present the secrecy rate comparison
against transmit SNR between our proposed scheme
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(HCJ) and traditional relay selection scheme (TRS),
where we let γsr = γrd and γrr = 5 dB, assuming that the
channel error parameter is g = 0.3. It can be intuitively
shown that, when S-E and R-E channels have similar
gains (γse = γre = 15 dB), secrecy rate is higher than the
situation when one of the eavesdropping channels is
weak (γse = 20 dB, γre = 15 dB). HCJ scheme far outper-
forms TRS scheme because of cooperative jamming
based on robust design and hybrid FD/HD protocols.
Figure 4 presents the secrecy outage probability of
different methods versus secrecy rate threshold, where
we let channel error parameter g = 0.3, γsr = γrd =
40 dB and γrr = 5 dB. As seen in the figure, TRS
scheme yields higher outage probability than HCJ
scheme. When the secrecy rate threshold increases,
outage probability of HCJ and TRS schemes would
get close since the secrecy rate of two schemes is far
less than the threshold rate.
Figure 5 plots the secrecy rate for the legitimate des-
tination as a function of the channel error parameter g,
where we let γsr = γrd = 40 dB and γrr = 5 dB. It can be
observed from Fig. 5 that the secrecy rate of the TRS
scheme is deeply affected by the channel errors, while the
influence on HCJ is much less. Furthermore, when the
channel error bound ε increases, the robust HCJ scheme
guarantees better secrecy rate, while the non-robust de-
sign violates decline quite seriously especially for large g.
In Fig. 6, we present the secrecy rate comparison for
different transmit antennas M and assume γsr = γrd =
40 dB and γrr = 5 dB. Since the increase of cooperative
nodes can provide a better relay as the best relay to DF
useful signals and it generates stronger interference to
Fig. 3 Secrecy rate versus transmit SNR γsr = γrd, the channel error
parameter is set g = 0.3
Fig. 4 Secrecy outage probability versus secrecy rate threshold, the
channel error parameter is set g = 0.3
Fig. 5 Secrecy rate versus channel error parameter g, the transmit
SNR is fixed as γsr = γrd = 40 dB
Fig. 6 Secrecy rate versus number of cooperative nodes M, the
transmit SNR is fixed as γsr = γrd = 40 dB and the channel error
parameter is set g = 0.3
Lin et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:129 Page 8 of 10
confuse eavesdropper, the secrecy rate of the two
schemes gets better while the number of nodes in-
creases. Not surprisingly, the secrecy rate performance
of hybrid scheme is better than the traditional one under
the same condition. Moreover, we observe that the se-
crecy rate achieved by TRS scheme increased slowly
compared with our proposed scheme, while the coopera-
tive nodes increase.
Finally, we compare the computational complexity
of our proposed scheme and TRS scheme. For the
sake of notational simplicity, we evaluate how the
computational complexity of both schemes scale with
the number of nodes M. In our proposed scheme, the
complexity of the opportunistic relay selection is
O(M). The complexity order of obtain fr and fd
through solving the SDP problem (11)–(16) is O(M5)
[20]. Thus, the computational complexity of our pro-
posed scheme is O(M5). For the TRS scheme, the
major computation task is how to obtain best relay R*
based on imperfect CSI (30), which has complexity
order of O(M). Thus, the computational complexity
of traditional CJ scheme is O(M). Based on the ana-
lysis above, we find that our proposed scheme has a
higher complexity than traditional one. However, the
proposed scheme outperforms TRS scheme both on
secrecy rate and secrecy outage probability.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we addressed a hybrid opportunistic relay-
ing and jamming strategy in multi-relay system under
imperfect channel estimation. A proactive opportunistic
relay selection is proposed, in which the criteria are
based on the channel conditions. To enhance secrecy
performance of cooperative jamming under channel un-
certainty, we transform the optimization problem into a
SDP with some LMI constraints, which is solved by the
interior point approach. Furthermore, we derive the se-
crecy rate and deduce the outage probability. Since our
proposed scheme takes advantages of cooperative jam-
ming with robust design and increases interference on
eavesdropper through hybrid FD/HD protocols, simula-
tion results demonstrated that the proposed scheme
leads to significant improvement than TRS strategy in
distributed relay system.
Appendix




s:t: ~hje þ eje
 	H






The constraints of (32) can be rewritten as
s:t: eHjeQzeje þ 2Re ~hHjeQz~hje
 
þ ~hHjeQz~hje−u≥0
−eHje eje þ ε2≥0:
ð33Þ
According to the S-procedure, there exists an eje satis-









Applying the Schur complement, (34) can be
expressed as
−κε2 þ ~hHjeQz~hje−~hHjeQz κIM þQzð Þ†Qz~hje≥u ð35Þ
Then, the problem (35) becomes
max
Qz ;κ≥0





−κε2 þ ~hHjeQz~hje−~hHje ξ~hje
s:t: Qz κIM þQzð Þ†Qz≺ ξ:
ð37Þ
Therefore, we use the Schur complement to transform

















and the proof is completed.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Acknowledgements
This work is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
(No.61371122 and No. 61471393) and the China Postdoctoral Science
Foundation under a Special Financial Grant No. 2013T60912.
Received: 1 September 2015 Accepted: 24 April 2016
References
1. AD Wyner, The wire-tap channel. Bell Syst. Tech. J. 54(8), 1355–1387 (1975)
2. GF Pivaro, G Fraidenraich, CF Dias, Outage probability for MIMO relay
channel. IEEE Trans. Commun. 62(11), 3791–3800 (2014)
3. C Chien, H Su, H Li, Joint beamforming and power allocation for MIMO
relay broadcast channel with individual sinr constraints. IEEE Trans. Veh.
Technol. 63(4), 1660–1677 (2014)
Lin et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:129 Page 9 of 10
4. C Wang, H Wang, X Xia, Hybrid opportunistic relaying and jamming with
power allocation for secure cooperative networks. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory
14(2), 589–605 (2015)
5. E Tekin, A Yener, The general Gaussian multiple access and two-way
wire-tap channels: achievable rates and cooperative jamming. IEEE Trans.
Inf. Theory 54(6), 2735–2751 (2008)
6. G Zheng, LC Choo, KK Wong, Optimal cooperative jamming to enhance physical
layer security using relays. IEEE Trans. Signal Process. 59(3), 1317–1322 (2011)
7. JC Chen, RQ Zhang, LY Song, Z Han, BL Jiao, Joint relay and jammer
selection for secure two-way relay networks. IEEE Trans. Inf. Fore. Theory
7(1), 310–320 (2012)
8. G Zheng, I Krikidis, J Li, Joint relay and jammer selection for secure two-way
relay networks. IEEE Trans. Signal Process. 61(20), 4962–4974 (2013)
9. F Zhu, F Gao, M Yao, H Zou, Joint information- and jamming-beamforming
for physical layer security with full duplex base station. IEEE Commun. Lett.
62(24), 6391–6401 (2014)
10. T Riihonen, S Werner, R Wichman, Hybrid full-duplex/half-duplex relaying with
transmit power adaptation. IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun. 10(9), 3074–3085
(2011)
11. J Lee, TQS Quek, Hybrid full-/half-duplex system analysis in heterogeneous
wireless networks. IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun. 14(5), 2883–2895 (2015)
12. J Huang, AL Swindlehurst, Robust secure transmission in MISO channels
based on worst-case optimization. IEEE Trans. Signal Process. 60(3), 1696–1707
(2012)
13. C Wang, H Wang, Joint relay selection and artificial jamming power
allocation for secure DF relay networks. IEEE International Conference on
Communication (ICC2014), 819–824 (2015)
14. M Bengtsson, B Ottersten, Optimal and suboptimal transmit beamforming,
in Handbook of Antennas in Wireless Communications, Florida, U. S, 2001
15. M Bloch, J Barros, MRD Rodrigues, SW McLaughlin, Wireless information-
theoretic security. IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 54(6), 2515–2534 (2008)
16. VNQ Bao, NL Trung, M Debbah, Relay selection schemes for dual-hop
networks under security constraints with multiple eavesdroppers. IEEE Trans.
Wireless Commun. 12(12), 6076–6085 (2013)
17. Y Zou, X Wang, W Shen, Optimal relay selection for physical-layer security
in cooperative wireless networks. IEEE J. Select. Areas Commun.
31(10), 2099–2111 (2013)
18. J Sturm, Using sedumi 1.02: a Matlab toolbox for optimization over
symmetric cones. Opt. Meth. Software 11–12, 625–653 (1999)
19. I Krikidis, JS Thompson, Relay selection for secure cooperative networks
with jamming. IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun. 8(10), 5003–5011 (2009)
20. Y Nesterov, A Nemirovsky, Interior-point polynomial methods in convex
programming. Studies in Applied Mathematics 13, 8–30 (1994)
21. A Bletsas, H Shin, MZ Win, Cooperative communications with outage-optimal
opportunistic relaying. IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun. 6(9), 3450–3460 (2007)
Submit your manuscript to a 
journal and beneﬁ t from:
7 Convenient online submission
7 Rigorous peer review
7 Immediate publication on acceptance
7 Open access: articles freely available online
7 High visibility within the ﬁ eld
7 Retaining the copyright to your article
    Submit your next manuscript at 7 springeropen.com
Lin et al. EURASIP Journal on Wireless Communications and Networking  (2016) 2016:129 Page 10 of 10
